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Abstract 
In this paper, we uncover the relationships among social trust, corruption and the duration of 
economic crises. Our theoretical foundation is based on a collection of studies from different 
academic fields, especially political science, sociology and economics. We corroborate our 
arguments with both descriptive analysis and regression analysis of secondary data. Our dataset 
includes 11,364 observations distributed across 211 countries. The quantitative findings show that 
social trust is correlated with the duration of economic crises. Connecting our theoretical stance 
with the empirical evidence, we propose several possible explanations for the findings and provide 
both theoretical and practical implications. 
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Introduction 
From time to time, the media asserts that corruption hinders economic growth and keeps corrupt 
nations from advancing further on their economic journey. There is no doubt that corruption plays 
a key role in the development level of a country. No country is free of corruption or the 
responsibility for finding international solutions to it, though the problem is generally more 
widespread in low-income than wealthier countries (Søreide, 2016). What factors determine the 
wealth of a nation? A general consensus is that technology, natural resources and physical and 
human capital constitute such factors (Jorgenson, 1991). However, from a social capital theorist 
perspective, the positive and negative social forces within each society can either harm or 
strengthen the affluence of a nation (Ostrom & Ahn, 2009). From this standpoint, a less familiar 
factor emerges and plays a key role in assessing the level of wealth—namely, social trust. Prior 
research reveals that there is a strong relationship between corruption and social trust (Rothstein, 
2005).  
Several links may connect economic crisis with corruption and social trust. Corruption and social 
trust are closely linked through mutual connections with inequality. This is because a dishonest 
government results in higher inequality and lower social trust (Rothstein, 2005). In addition, 
several studies have examined the relationship between crime and employment, earnings or labour 
market conditions (see Fougère et al., 2010; Lin, 2008; Raphael & Winter-Ebmer, 2001). Despite 
evidence that economic crisis and crimes are potentially related, few studies have focused on the 
relationship between economic crisis and corruption. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to 
investigate the connections among economic crisis, social trust and corruption in society.  
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First, we present our theoretical framework along with the hypotheses. In this part, we conduct a 
literature review of what has been done, examining the most recent studies on social trust, 
economic crisis and corruption. Second, we present our methodology and empirical approach. In 
this part, we begin with a presentation of the used databases and then introduce the analytical 
techniques and adjustments made while structuring the databases. Third, we introduce our 
empirical model, before discussing the weaknesses of our data. We also focus on the results of our 
descriptive and econometric analyses. The purpose of the descriptive analysis is to illustrate the 
possible correlations among the variables. In the econometric analysis, we consider whether the 
duration of economic crises is related to social trust and corruption. Finally, we discuss the results 
with respect to theoretical and practical implications, present the limitations, and offer ideas for 
further research.  
Theory and hypotheses 
Social trust is defined as the faith people put in the society to which they belong (Taylor et al., 
2007). One reason for the growing interest in social trust is that it is positively correlated with 
many other factors in social science (Rothstein, 2005). Citizens who have high trust in their 
communities are also likely to have positive views of democratic institutions. They also participate 
more actively in politics, give more to charity and show more empathy to minorities in their 
societies. In addition, these people tend to be more satisfied and to have greater beliefs in their 
abilities to influence their own lives (Dinesen & Thisted, 2013; Leung et al., 2011). On a societal 
level, countries whose citizens have high trust have better democratic institutions, possess more 
open economies, have higher economic growth and have less crime and corruption (Bjørnskov, 
2009; Richey, 2010; Rothstein, 2013).  
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Creation of social trust 
The causes of social trust have long been the subject of debate among social researchers (Rothstein, 
2013). Two main perspectives have a bearing on social trust. The first is the society-centred 
approach (Hooghe & Stolle, 2003). Researchers who share this perspective believe that citizens of 
a society generate social trust through their engagement in social activities, especially 
volunteering. However, this approach does not align well with empirical research (Delhey & 
Newton, 2003; Rothstein, 2013), which argues that there is a self-selection problem at hand, such 
that people who participate in voluntary associations are already high-trust citizens. In addition, 
voluntary activities do not contribute to the improvement of social trust among organizational 
members (Stolle, 2003). The second perspective holds that social trust results from the level of 
equality in a society (Rothstein, 2005). Equality comes in two types: economic and opportunity. 
Economic equality is easier to measure because it can be quantified by how resources are 
redistributed among members of a society. Equality of opportunity, however, is a more crucial 
form of equality because, even in the case of economic inequality, policies that support opportunity 
equality can play an important role in improving social trust. An example of this is investment in 
universal education programs, as education has the potential to strengthen the economic prospects 
and is one of the most critical factors to enhance social trust (Brehm & Rahn, 1997). The second 
perspective is the institution-centred approach. Supporters of this approach believe that an honest, 
incorrupt and efficient government is a key factor for the development of social trust in a society 
(Rothstein, 2013). These supporters also believe in a strong correlation between high-trust 
societies and incorrupt government. Using survey data, research also concludes that honest 
political institutions positively contribute to interpersonal trust (Bjørnskov, 2009; Freitag & 
Buhlmann, 2005). 
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Social trust and economics    
From an economic standpoint, social trust has a positive effect on the economy of a nation. Social 
trust reduces the cost of third-party interference among economic actors (Uslaner, 2002). It thus 
facilitates transactions while decreasing the costs of controlling, such as the costs tied to 
government intervention. As a result, the saved resources can be invested in other beneficial 
activities such as education and infrastructure to the benefit of the overall growth of the economy 
(Graeff & Svendsen, 2013). In a high-trust environment, time and effort are expended more 
effectively because investors do not need to worry about the validity of their agents. As a result, 
higher productivity is likely to evolve (Knack & Stephen, 2001). Evidence also indicates that trust 
affects education, rule of law and government quality. Together, these three factors increase the 
investment rate and provide a positive impact on economic growth (Bjørnskov, 2012). 
Furthermore, social trust can improve human capital, enhance government efficiency and 
strengthen the positive effects on economic growth (Deng et al., 2012).  
Corruption and its origins 
According to Søreide (2016), corruption is defined as the trade in decisions that should not be for 
sale. The word is associated with illegal activities that abuse authority to gain personal benefits. 
Corruption can also be applied to culprits who demand and facilitate trade in decisions through 
bribery. Consequently, corruption weakens the foundation of government authority and destroys 
the basis for state development. It is therefore considered a very serious form of crime. 
There is no country in the world that is free of corruption. However, the problem is more severe 
in low-income countries than in wealthier nations (Søreide, 2016). Many researchers believe that 
corruption in higher-income countries or countries that have better-performing institutions may be 
underestimated. The reason is that in these countries, corruption happens in more subtle forms and 
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usually with better concealment (Søreide, 2016). The rate of extortive corruption is often higher 
in poor countries, while the rate of collusive corruption is not significantly related to income levels 
(Søreide, 2016). Nevertheless, the types of corruption that are usually studied may not be the most 
dangerous ones. Cronyism, which is the connection between powerful business leaders and 
politicians, is usually regarded as more destructive and more difficult to measure than other forms 
of corruption (Lambsdorff, 2015). However, evidence suggests that poorer countries with less 
effective governments also suffer from cronyism (Fisman & Miguel, 2010). Corruption on a 
political level is particularly detrimental to development, because politicians and business leaders 
exert excessive control over resources that are imperative for development (Acemoglu et al., 
2001). Another example is rent-seeking. It implies improving one’s share from existing resources 
without creating new wealth for the society. Thus, rent-seeking dwindles economic efficiency 
because skilled agents use their time and capability to capture the rents rather than participating in 
productive activities (Collier & Goderis, 2007; Kolstad & Wiig, 2011; Robinson et al., 2006).  
Social trust and corruption 
From a political standpoint, incorrupt and honest governments promote social trust inside a 
community, while corrupt and inefficient governments destroy trust among people (Rothstein, 
2005, 2013; Sun & Wang, 2012). By interacting with corrupt officials, citizens not only lose trust 
in institutions but also in other people in their communities (Rothstein, 2013; Sun & Wang, 2012). 
According to Rothstein (2013), one of the reasons for this phenomenon is that it is impossible for 
a normal citizen to measure the trust of all the people in a society. Citizens generalize their beliefs 
about the trustworthiness of public officials to the whole population. If they have a negative 
experience with public officials, they are not likely to trust ordinary citizens. In addition, they 
relate to other people as being untrustworthy, because they believe others also engage in corrupt 
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activities through contact with corrupt public officials. As a result, they consider themselves as 
corrupt individuals and thus lose trust in themselves.  
Research also shows linkages between corruption and inequality that affect social trust indirectly 
(Uslaner, 2012). The link between equality and trust can be casually explained by two reasons 
(Rothstein, 2005). First, economic inequality and low equality of opportunity increase pessimism 
among poor people. Because they feel that societies do not treat them fairly, especially in the 
education and labour markets, they begin losing trust in others who possess more resources. 
Second, when the level of inequality is high, people do not believe that they share a common 
destiny. The income gap between the rich and the poor further separates the two groups, because 
neither group regards itself as part of a larger entity. Instead, this separation strengthens the 
negative stereotypes about each group, degrading the level of trust to an even lower point. It thus 
becomes more difficult to close the gap between the groups (Boix & Posner, 1998).  
In addition, the link among trust, corruption and inequality can be shown by distinguishing 
between generalized and particularized trust. Generalized trust refers to the trust in all people 
regardless of the differences between groups in a society. By contrast, particularized trust reflects 
the close relationship between similar individuals, in terms of economic situation, gender and 
social class. Particularized trust also implies the distrust of those outside one’s own social circle 
(Uslaner, 2002). Corruption can only promote particularized trust. In a corrupt society, public 
officers only reward the people who show loyalty to them (Rothstein, 2005). Corrupt politicians 
also steal resources from the state to enrich themselves and their immediate business circle 
(Uslaner, 2012). Particularized trust is the exact opposite of social trust because it damages the 
relationship between people from different backgrounds (Uslaner, 2002). In a society in which 
people care less for those outside their own social group, social trust cannot exist. This is because 
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each group only care about its own interests, at the expense of the needs of other group. Group 
members may even perceive demands from the other group to be in conflict with their own well-
being, leading to more resentment and social conflict. Eventually, the rich and the poor cannot 
reach a common understanding and are bound to be further separated from each other. These 
effects create a social trap of inequality and low trust in societies that already have a high level of 
corruption. Therefore, corruption maintains a high level of inequality that worsen social trust in an 
endless and continuing cycle that seems impossible to break (Uslaner, 2012).  
Economic crisis duration and its consequences 
The duration of a crisis increases with the complexity of it, and complexity is related to the severity 
of the impact (Laeven & Valencia, 2018). For example, longer and more complex crises are 
associated with larger capital outflows and worse outcomes in terms of output loss and inflation. 
Laeven and Valencia (2018) defined crisis duration as the start and the end of a crisis. The end 
date of a crisis period refers to the year before both real gross domestic product (GDP) growth and 
real credit growth are positive for at least two consecutive years. 
Research on the financial crisis of 2007–2008 found that the crisis affected countries and 
individuals of different social classes unequally (Sachweh, 2018). Normally, the impact of a crisis 
is associated with an increase in state responsibility, greater welfare support and redistribution of 
wealth (Blekesaune, 2013; Naumann et al., 2016). However, this association is not homogeneous 
because of the differences in social class positions, national economic conditions and social 
spending levels (Chzhen, 2016; Mertens & Beblo, 2016; Sachweh, 2018). On an individual level, 
a stronger perceived crisis impact is associated with more favourable attitudes towards welfare 
state support (Fraile & Fons, 2005; Jeene et al., 2014). However, welfare state support is less 
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related to a perceived crisis impact when social spending is higher, indicating that encompassing 
welfare states reduce the subjective impact of the crisis (Blekesaune, 2013). 
Unemployment can be a ‘class risk’, if social consequences of economic downturns are distributed 
unevenly among individuals (Eurofund, 2012; Rueda, 2012; Sachweh, 2018). In general, members 
of disadvantaged social groups (e.g., low-income earners, low-skilled workers, young people) are 
exposed to greater social risks during economic downturns than members of privileged groups 
(Chzhen, 2016; OECD, 2019). This is because disadvantaged groups have less economic resources 
to buffer against economic downturns, and this is especially evident over longer periods (Kluegel, 
1988). As such, they are more dependent on state benefits to maintain their standard of living than 
members of more privileged groups. In addition, people from disadvantaged groups often have 
smaller social networks that could work as additional social support during an economic crisis 
(Reeskens & van Oorschot, 2014). Incidentally, during the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the increase 
in social spending in European countries was lowest in the countries that were most affected by 
the crisis. This indicates that there are differences in countries’ capacities to handle the effects of 
economic downturns (Leschke & Jespen, 2012). European welfare states still differ in their 
institutional design and generosity, as well as in their social and labour market policy responses to 
a crisis (Scruggs & Allan, 2006; Starke et al., 2013; Van Hooren et al., 2014). 
Hariri et al.’s (2016) study on developing countries indicates that economic shocks, such as 
unanticipated currency devaluations, have a strong and negative causal effect on how people rate 
their living conditions and sense of well-being. This research is consistent with earlier findings 
showing that a financial crisis adds a non-negligible cost to individual well-being and that macro-
economic movements strongly influence perceived happiness on a national basis (Di Tella et al., 
2003; Montagnoli & Moro, 2014). Furthermore, Dix-Carneiro and Kovak (2015) discovered that 
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the long-term recovery of employment rates after an economic shock is fully dependent on the 
development of the informal sector. This suggests that informal employment keeps individuals 
from engaging in crime. It also indicates that labour regulations, which reduce informality and 
increase unemployment, can intensify the level of crime related to an economic crisis. Still, local 
crises that cause a reduction in labour demand may affect crime in different ways, such as by 
decreasing government revenues and affecting the supply of public goods (Dix-Carneiro et al., 
2017).  
 
It is hypothesized that societies with high social trust and less corruption can handle a crisis better 
than their counterparts. By contrast, high corruption and low social trust intensify the crisis 
duration. Several research findings agree that social trust plays a key role in the development of a 
country (Rothstein, 2005). A high level of social trust is positively correlated with stronger 
democratic institutions and higher economic growth and negatively correlated with the level of 
crime and corruption (Bjørnskov, 2009; Richey, 2010; Rothstein, 2013). Social trust is also rooted 
in an honest and incorrupt government (Bjørnskov, 2009; Freitag & Buhlmann, 2005; Rothstein, 
2013). For this reason, the cost of controlling economic agents is considerably lower in high-trust 
communities (Uslaner, 2002). Moreover, social trust reduces interference from governments and 
encourages business transactions. As a result, infrastructure and welfare policies benefit because 
governments have larger funds to invest in them (Graeff & Svendsen, 2013). We argue that social 
trust can counteract the consequences of an economic crisis to a certain extent, because efficient 
governments can detect the errors faster and can manage challenges better. Furthermore, everyday 
businesses may even take advantage of the crisis to restructure their organizations, improve 
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technology and develop their human resources. In addition, a low level of corruption means that 
public funds can be employed more optimally for the recovery of a country. 
 Nevertheless, a lack of trust may increase the gap between rich and poor social groups and, most 
importantly, promote corruption (Uslaner, 2012). Countries with a high level of corruption often 
ignore their potential to uplift the economy (Søreide, 2016). Evidence also shows that an economic 
crisis presents serious challenges to national security because it increases crime levels (Dix-
Carneiro & Kovak, 2015). In addition, corruption reduces a country’s ability to protect its national 
resources, which make them more vulnerable to embezzlement (Kolstad & Wiig, 2011). Thus, 
during economic crises, high corruption will increase the resentment of the poor social groups 
towards the elites and the governments. In addition, affected citizens may take the crisis as an 
opportunity to challenge the government and its management of the economy. As a result, the 
reduced financial budgeting during an economic crisis is further restrained to tighten security 
control and to protect the corrupt government from public anger and higher crime rates. These 
factors worsen the recovering abilities of nations and increase the duration of an economic crisis. 
Hypothesis 1: Social trust has a negative correlation with the duration time of an 
economic crisis. 
Hypothesis 2: Corruption has a positive correlation with the duration time of an 
economic crisis.  
Method 
Presentation of databases 
The dataset of social trust and corruption that we applied came from the Quality of Government 
(QoG) Institute database (https://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads) developed by University of 
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Gothenburg. The database comprises five datasets and is freely available from the QoG Institute’s 
website. The mission of the database is to provide good governance. We exclusively worked with 
the QoG standard database, which is the largest dataset of the five and includes almost 2,100 
variables from more than 100 data sources. 
We also used the Global Crises Data by Country database.1 This database includes data related to 
banking, systemic malfunctioning and inflation crises measured during a period spanning from 
1800 to 2016 in more than 70 countries. The Behavioral and Financial Stability (BFFS) project 
was founded at Harvard Business School and the Global Crises Data by Country is part of the 
BFFS project’s database. The project maintains an ongoing real-time database of financial stability 
indicators and is available to both researchers and the public.  
Analysis techniques  
Our study is based on two methods: descriptive and econometric analysis. As a first step, we 
perform a descriptive analysis on a dataset including social trust, corruption and economic crisis 
as variables. The intention of the descriptive analysis is to glean insight into whether there are 
significant correlations between the duration of economic crises and social trust/corruption. As a 
second step, we apply econometric techniques to analyse our data. The purpose of the econometric 
analysis is to assess the connections between the dependent and independent variables. For the 
hypotheses, we introduce a multiple regression with control variables. We select the control 
variables to be able to exclude factors that can significantly affect the interpretation of the 
empirical results. In this mission, we use the software package STATA 14.0 (Wooldridge, 2016) 
as a basis for our analyses.  
                                                
1 See https://www.hbs.edu/behavioral-finance-and-financial-stability/data/Pages/global.aspx. 
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Structuring of data 
In Table 1, we compare the assortment of the original datasets with our dataset. After scaling, we 
kept all the countries and reduced the number of variables from 2,202 to 9. Consequently, the 
number of observations in our dataset is also reduced to ~74% and includes 11,364 observations 
distributed across 211 countries. However, we collect the dataset from different public sources, 
and consequently, some of the variables may lack observations. Furthermore, we exclude extreme 
variables in the econometric analysis. Therefore, the regressions may differ in the number of 
observations from what we state here. 
____________________ 
Table 1 about here 
____________________ 
In addition, we created a dummy variable for the economic crises when at least one crisis is 
occurring in a specific year in a country (1 = at least one crisis in this year and country, 0 = no 
crisis in this year and country). The reason for this is to observe the effects on the regression models 
when there was at least one ongoing crisis. Consequently, the number of observations in the 
econometric analysis is reduced to 5,112 observations (44.98%). In the following subsections, 
when no specific changes are mentioned, we make no adjustments to the variables.  
Dependent variables 
Again, crisis duration is the period from the start to the end of a crisis. In the Global Crises Data 
by Country database, each crisis – whether it is related to banking, systemic malfunctioning or 
inflation - has a dummy variable for when a crisis is occurring in a specific year and country (1 = 
crisis, 0 = no crisis). To measure the crisis duration, we add a dummy variable for when at least 
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one of the crises is occurring in a specific year in a country. Then, we count the number of 
consecutive crisis years to measure the duration of economic crises in each country. As a result, 
we measure the crisis duration in number of years between the start and the end of the crisis. The 
skewness of the crisis duration variable is 0.84, which makes it acceptable for further analyses 
(George & Mallery, 2011). 
Independent variables 
When people have social trust, they put faith in one another in a society. In the QoG standard 
database, social trust is reported as an index score. The index score represents an average of all 
country-survey scores available within each country-year observation. These scores range from 0 
(lowest level of trust) to 100 (highest level of trust).  
A higher level of social trust is correlated with stronger democratic institutions and higher 
economic growth. These factors are the foundations of economic equality (Bjørnskov, 2009; 
Richey, 2010). Additionally, social trust arises from economic equality, and is also a product of 
equality of opportunity and incorrupt governments (Rothstein, 2005). This indicates that a high 
level of equality in turn will increase the level of social trust or vice versa (Uslaner, 2012). Since 
the economic growth and equality gap of each nation are changing constantly the Social trust 
index should be dynamic in nature.  
Corruption is defined as the abuse of public power for private gain. We use the Bayesian 
Corruption Index (BCI), obtained from the QoG standard database, to represent the corruption 
level. The BCI is a composite index of the perceived overall level of corruption and ranges between 
0 (everyone agrees there is no corruption at all) and 100 (corruption is as bad as it can get). 
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Studies have shown that low-income countries seem to suffer more from corruption than their 
wealthier counterparts (Søreide, 2016). For that reason, we believe that the severity of corruption 
tends to decline as nations strive to improve their economic conditions. On the other hand, it also 
implies that when the economic situation deteriorates, the level of corruption will increase as a 
result.  
 
Additionally, corruption is regarded as one of the main obstacles for the advancement of 
economy and society (Søreide, 2016). As serious as it may sound, corruption hinders economic 
growth and social development. This is since corrupt agents abuse their political power by 
essentially trading public benefits for personal gains. Almost any country in the world realizes 
these problems and tries to eliminate or at least reduce the level of corruption. Consequently, 
governments keep improving policies and laws against corruption. The capability of these laws 
and policies depends on various factors such as the independence of courts as well as 
governments’ transparency and institutions’ effectiveness. Nevertheless, these laws and policies 
are bound to have some effect on corruption levels over time.  
 
For these reasons mentioned above, it is safe for us to conclude that corruption and social trust are 
not static but dynamic in nature. This is important to keep in mind since neglecting the dynamic 
aspects in the analysis may lead to a specification error in the regressions.  
Control variables 
Population capabilities can affect how well the citizens of a country handle challenges and how 
well they are able to process news from economic crises. To measure population capabilities, we 
use the Human Development Index (HDI) obtained from the QoG databases. The HDI is a 
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composite measure that captures the average achievements in three essential dimensions of human 
development: health, knowledge and standard of living. 
Equality has the potential to affect the level of social trust and corruption. Higher levels of 
inequality may create distrust among different social classes and worsen the level of social trust. 
To be able to measure equality, we use the Gini index obtained from the QoG databases. The Gini 
index measures the degree of inequality in the distribution of family income by country. The more 
equal a country's income distribution, the lower is the Gini index (Gini = 0). The more unequal a 
country's income distribution is, the higher is the Gini index (Gini = 100).   
 
Results 
Empirical specifications 
Interpretation of any empirical econometric analysis must be based on relevant theories to provide 
sound results. In this research, we use a panel data model because our dataset provides a time series 
for each country unit. We limit the regression analysis only to periods when at least one economic 
crisis is present. Consequently, we use the following empirical model only when there is an 
economic crisis present. We use the crisis dummy variable created previously to limit the period 
(see the section Structuring of data): 
A: Crisis durationi,t = α + β1 × Social Trusti,t + β2 × HDIi,t + β3 × Ginii,t + Vt + ai + ui,t. 
 B: Crisis durationi,t = α + β1 × BCIi,t + β2 × HDIi,t + β3 × Ginii,t + Vt + ai + ui,t. 
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In the regression model, α represents the intercepts of regressions, β represents the coefficient 
values of each variable, Vt represents time variance factors that do not vary between countries, ai 
represents individual-specific factors of countries that do not vary over time, and ui,t represents an 
idiosyncratic error term. The lower-case letter “i” represents country unit, and the lower-case letter 
“t” represents time unit (year). 
We use “year” as a unit to measure the duration of an economic crises. In general, it is difficult to 
date some of the crises included in the dataset because of the difficulty of confirming the date of 
the final resolution (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). The implication is that several crises risk being 
computed as either too short or too long.  
Descriptive analysis 
As Table 2 shows, social trust has a positive skewness of 0.27 (0.36 during economic crises), 
whereas corruption has a negative skewness of –0.64 (–0.78 during economic crises). In addition, 
crisis duration has a positive skewness of 0.85. The kurtosis of the three values is less than 3. This 
implies that the distributions are shorter and the tails are thinner, due to less extreme values than 
that of a normal distribution.  
____________________ 
Table 2 about here 
____________________ 
Table 2 shows significant differences between how many observations are recorded in the two 
observed periods. In other words, we have more observations during periods of economic crises. 
In isolation, this implies that we have a better basis for obtaining reliable results for periods with 
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an economic crisis present. However, it must be noted that the mean is an average of all countries. 
The standard deviation and the percentiles imply that there are large differences between countries.  
Figure 1 illustrates the possible correlations among crisis duration, social trust and corruption. We 
observe that there is minimal correlation between social trust and the duration of economic crises. 
Similarly, the BCI has minimal correlation with the duration of economic crises. 
 
____________________ 
Figure 1 about here 
____________________  
Econometric analysis 
The purpose of the econometric analysis is to determine whether the indicators of economic crises 
are related to social trust and corruption during periods with economic crises. We used a multiple 
regression analysis, specifically the ordinary least squares method. In the econometric analysis, 
we consider only the period when it contains at least one economic crisis. We also perform a 
Hausman test to choose between a fixed- and random-effect estimator (Black et al., 2009). The 
fixed-effect row in the regression tables shows “no” for the random-effect estimator and “yes” for 
the fixed-effect estimator.  
As Table 3 shows, the coefficient of the social trust index is statistically significant (p < 0.05; 
regression number 1). Therefore, social trust reliably correlates with the duration of economic 
crises. This implies that with an increase of one unit in the social trust index, the duration of 
economic crises decreases by 0.02 year (i.e., approximately one week). This result provides 
support for Hypothesis 1. Table 3 also reveals that the coefficient of the BCI is not statistically 
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significant. Therefore, corruption does not correlate with the duration of economic crises. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2 is rejected.  
____________________ 
Table 3 about here 
____________________  
 
Fitness of the model 
We report the F-test results for the fixed-effect models and the chi-square test results for the 
random-effect models. These results better reflect how well our regression model fits the data than 
a model without any independent variables. The rule of thumb is that the F-test and the chi-square 
test results should be less than 0.05 for us to reject the null hypothesis of the two tests (Wooldridge, 
2016). The models of Hypotheses 1 have a result lower than 0.05 in the F-test and the chi-square 
test. Accordingly, it is safe to reject the null hypothesis.  
Discussion 
Theoretical implications 
 
The econometric analysis shows that social trust is negatively correlated with the duration of 
economic crises. This means that higher trust reduces the duration of economic crises and lower 
trust increases the duration of economic crises. One week might seem much shorter than the “year” 
unit that measures the duration of economic crises; however, social trust is measured as an index 
score, which represents an average of all the surveys in a country each year. Therefore, the level 
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of social trust will not drastically change from high to low within a year. By contrast, a higher 
level of social trust is correlated with stronger democratic institutions and higher economic growth. 
These factors are also the foundations of economic equality (Bjørnskov, 2009; Richey, 2010). 
Furthermore, social trust arises from economic equality, equality of opportunity and incorrupt 
governments (Rothstein, 2005). This indicates that a high level of social trust upholds a high level 
of equality, which in turn increases the level of social trust (Uslaner, 2012). Therefore, when there 
is a change in social trust, either for the better or for the worse, the direction of that change will 
stay the same (virtuous or vicious circle effect). This is assumed to be true even if the changes are 
smaller in the short run. In the long run, the changes may be greater.   
Moreover, the duration of a crisis increases with the complexity of an economic crisis, and the 
complexity is related to the severity of the impact (Laeven & Valencia, 2018). This indicates that 
social trust may marginalize the duration of economic crises by reducing their complexity and 
severity. Social trust can indirectly reduce the severity of the impact by facilitating investments in 
infrastructure and in welfare policies. Moreover, low social trust increases inequality and decreases 
the effectiveness of welfare programs. This usually has a negative impact on a country’s recovering 
abilities (Soss, 2001; Tella & MacCulloch, 2009; Uslaner, 2012).  
Practical implications 
Our findings indicate that social trust and corruption do not correlate during economic crises. 
Furthermore, our findings suggest that an increase in equality during economic crises may increase 
GDP growth, reduce public debt and reduce inflation rate (Nguyen & Dinh, 2019). Therefore, 
equality-based policies could benefit a society in several ways during an economic crisis. In this 
article, we mention two of the most common policies (for further discussion about the policies, see 
Nguyen & Dinh, 2019).  
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Universal welfare programs reward all people equally, regardless of their social class or income, 
while means-tested welfare programs reward specific groups through some selection methods 
(Rothstein, 2005). We recommend using universal welfare programs to avoid treating 
disadvantaged groups differently from other groups. Means-tested programs may create 
resentment from unfortunate individuals towards the wealthy and decrease rather than increase 
social trust (Rothstein, 2005; Soss, 2001; Uslaner, 2012). Such programs will therefore likely 
worsen the situation, especially during downturns (Tella & MacCulloch, 2009). By contrast, it 
could be difficult to gain public support to implement universal welfare programs in a society 
with low social trust, particularly during periods of economic constraint (Rothstein, 2005). In 
situations in which there is not enough public support to initiate universal welfare programs, we 
argue that it is better not to implement other welfare programs that may result in higher 
inequality. 
Differences in income, early education and school quality are the key components that contribute 
to sustained inequality over generations (Checchi, 2001; Thomas et al., 2001). Therefore, 
investment in education beginning in childhood can increase productivity and reduce inequality 
(Heckman, 2011). Programs targeting disadvantaged children will likely generate high economic 
returns for those children. However, universal education programs benefit a greater number of 
children and generate a higher total of net positive benefits (Barnett, 2010). The benefits of 
investments in education, such as higher income and better health, accumulate over time (Day & 
Newburger, 2002; Mirowsky & Ross, 2005). Therefore, policy makers usually invest in policies 
with more short-term benefits. However, education has the potential to enhance the equality of 
opportunity and is one of the most critical factors to increase social trust (Brehm & Rahn, 1997). 
However, during economic downturns, it seems uneconomical to invest in something that yields 
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limited profit in the near future. It is therefore advisable for country states to begin with targeted 
programs with the goal to move to high-quality universal programs over time. Another solution 
is to target specific geographic areas, available for all children regardless of their social class. 
Targeting geographic areas reduces the cost of selection methods to identify which children are 
qualified for the program and potentially lessens the stigmatization of the children in the program 
(Checchi, 2001).  
Limitations 
One of the limitations of our research is the usage of secondary data. In this research, we use data 
from the QoG Institute database and from the BFFS project. Although these sources are 
trustworthy, the data might have been collected for purposes unrelated to our research. Thus, there 
is a possibility that this deficiency reduces the effectiveness of our empirical models. Moreover, 
there might be a mismatch between the two data sources. The variables included in the QoG 
database mostly pertain to 100 to 190 countries and territories; however, the BFFS project covers 
only 70 countries and territories. There are also imbalances among observations of the QoG 
database. Not all the variables from the QoG database contain needed information for the current 
research article. This irregularity, which reduces the number of observations for our research, may 
decrease the efficiency of the empirical interpretations (Saunders et al., 2016).  
 
The data we use come from several countries in different periods. The applied datasets allowed us 
to conduct our analyses on a large number of observations. Furthermore, a large number of 
observations enabled us to increase the degrees of freedom and to reduce the collinearity among 
the explanatory variables. As a result, the efficiency of our empirical analysis is increased 
(http://sites.utexas.edu/sos/degreesfreedom/). We also tried to increase the internal validity of our 
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research through rich data collection (Saunders et al., 2016). Moreover, we attempted to maintain 
a high level of external validity for our research findings. The variables we use are available in 
many countries, so we believe that our research findings will also apply to these (Saunders et al., 
2016).  
Future research 
An important issue for future research is to further explore the driving capability of corruption on 
economic crisis duration, as it was not possible for us to establish a reliable correlation between 
these variables. However, it is important to note that “corruption” can be measured in many ways 
and also that the concept can be reframed under alternative labels (e.g., ‘good governance’). Future 
research is thus necessary to carry out a more comprehensive analysis of the impact of corruption 
on economic crisis duration. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that social trust functions as a 
moderator of the relationship between corruption and economic crisis duration.  
Another issue that needs further investigation is the impact of an economic crisis duration of about 
one–two weeks on the political life of a society. This might seem to be an extremely short period, 
but consider, for example, the approximate cost of a worldwide crisis that lasts for this amount of 
time; the figure might turn out to be enormous. Econometric analyses are therefore required to 
shed light on this issue on a more detailed level.   
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Table 1. Downscaling of the dataset. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for corruption and social trust from the entire sample (descriptive 
statistics about crisis duration are when a crisis is present).  
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Table 3. Regression table for duration of economic crisis and social trust (1) and duration of 
economic crises and corruption (2). 
 
 
t statistics are in parentheses. 
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figure 1. Social trust and degree of corruption related to crisis duration. 
 
 
 
